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INsuRANcE-CoNDITIONs-EFFECT oF NaN-COMPLIANCE WITH

LIABILITY-Automobile liability insurance policies invariably contain a provision requiring immediate notice
of accident and suit.1 The purpose of such a provision is to allow the
insurer to make an investigation of the accident in order to prepare a
defense and to prevent fraudulent and invalid claims.2 Although com-

NoTICE CLAUSE ON INsURER's

1 "Immediate" notice is uniformly defined as "reasonably prompt" notice. 76 A.L.R.
23 (1932).
2 McCarthy v. Rendle, 230 Mass. 35, 119 N.E. 188 (1918); 33 MICH. L. RBv. 429
(1935).
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pliance with the provision may be of the utmost importance to the insurer, it frequently is a matter of little or no concern to the insured,3
and so upon the happening of an accident the insured frequently fails
to give due notice to the insurer. The succeeding action by the injured
party against the insurer, pursuant to the policy provisions and/or the
applicable liability insurance statute,4 then requires an answer to the
difficult question of what effect such non-compliance by the insured has
on the rights of the injured party against the insurer. The cases are not
in agreement as to what that answer should be,5 the difference of opinion arising from several factors: The intended meaning of the notice
clause, as conditioned by the legal effect to be given the liability insurance statute, is the starting point. In addition, in each of these cases a
court faces the possibility of two competing dangers: 6 (I) collusion
between the insured and the insurer to defeat the rights of the injured
party, and (2) collusion between the insured and the injured party to
defeat the rights of the insurer.7 Disagreement over these considerations has led to results that can be roughly divided under three classification statements: (I) that due notice is a condition precedent to recovery from the insurer, and since the injured party's rights can rise no
higher than the insured's rights under the policy, failure to comply bars
recovery; (2) that the injured party has a primary or absolute right of
recovery against the insurer at the instant the injury occurs and that the
insured or insurer cannot defeat that right by any subsequent act; and
(3) that the injured party's right, while subrogated to that of the insured, and, therefore, dependent upon the fulfillment of all the terms
of the policy, can only be defeated by non-compliance with the notice
provision where such non-compliance is prejudicial to the insurer. 8 A
substantial majority of the courts have accepted the first mentioned
position. 9 It is the purpose of this comment to point out what is believed
s This attitude can be ascribed to at least two possible causes: (1) the insured's
uncollectible financial status, or (2) his belief that he was without fault with regard to the
cause of the accident. Malloy v. Head, 90 N.H. 58 at 63, 4 A. (2d) 875 (1939).
4 James, "Accident Liability Reconsidered," 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); 7 AP.PLBMAN,
WSURANCB LAW AND PRACTICE 62 (1942).
5 Cases collected in 76 A.L.R. 23 (1932), 123 A.L.R. 950 (1939) and 18 A.L.R. (2d)
443 (1951).
.
6 Hynding v. Home Accident Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743, 7 P. (2d) 999 (1932); Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928); Tuder v. Commonwealth Cas. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1206, 163 A. 27 (1932); Buckner v. Buckner, 207
Wis. 303, 241 N.W. 342 (1932).
7 In more proper terms, the danger that the court fears is its own inability to detect
the presence of collusion in the cases, for when collusion is in fact found there is no
difficulty in determining whether the non-compliance is or is not significant.
8 26 VA. L. RBv. 215 (1939).
9 Malloy v. Head, 90 N.H. 58, 4 A. (2d) 875 (1939); Houran v. Preferred Accident
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to be an increasing trend toward adoption of this "majority" view by
those courts that have previously accepted either the primary right or
the prejudice rule position.

I. The "Primary Right" Rule
The assertion that the injured party has a "primary," "absolute" and
"independent" right to proceed against the insurer constitutes a total rejection of the orthodox holding that due notice is a condition precedent
to insurer's liability, while the requirement of prejudice to the insurer to
bar recovery assumes a middle ground position somewhere between the
other two views. Case support for the proposition that the injured
party's rights are in no way dependent upon those of the insured can
be found in at least :6.ve states.10 However, it is extremely doubtful
whether any state adheres to that position today. Its abandonment has
been accomplished by express disapproval and rejection,11 or by an
unwillingness on the part of the court to recognize its former position.12
Louisiana appears to be the only state in which there is any possibility
that the primary right rule will become the established law, and even
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 109 Vt. 258, 195 A. 253 (1937); Phillips v. Stone, 297 Mass. 341, 8
N.E. (2d) 890 (1937); Rushing v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 251 N.Y. 302, 167 N.E.
450 (1929); Peeler v. United States Cas. Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261 (1929); Heller
v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 27 Ohio App. 405, 161 N.E. 360 (1927); Bachhuber v.
Boosalis, 200 Wis. 574, 229 N.W. 117 (1930); Hoffman v. Employer's Liability Assurance
Corp., 146 Ore. 66, 29 P. (2d) 557 (1934); St. Louis Architectural Iron Co. v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co., (8th Cir. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 344, cert. den. 282 U.S. 882, 51
S.Ct. 86 (1930).
lOEdwards v. Fidelity Cas. Co., 11 La. App. 176, 123 S. 162 (1929); Metropolitan
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Albritton, 214 Ky. 16, 282 S.W. 187 (1926); Finkelberg v. Continental
Cas. Co., 126 Wash. 543, 219 P. 12 (1923); Collard v. Universal Automobile Ins. Co.,
55 Idaho 560, 45 P. (2d) 288 (1935) (dictum); Bachman v. Independence Indemnity
Co., 112 Cal. App. 465, 297 P. 110 (1931) (dictum).
11 The dictum in the Bachman case, supra note 10, was expressly disapproved by the
California court in Hynding v. Home Accident Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743, 7 P. (2d) 999
(1932). In Purefoy v. Pacific Automobile Indemnity Exchange, 5 Cal. (2d) 81, 53 P.
(2d) 155 (1935) the court made a valiant attempt to explain the embarrassing statement
in the Bachman case as being the result of a typographical error, but the court did not
explain why the Bachman court capped the statement in question by citing the Finkelberg
and Albritton cases, supra note 10, both clear-cut authority for the primary right view.
The Washington court overruled the Finkelberg decision in Merriman v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 147 Wash. 579, 266 P. 682 (1928).
12 In Southern Surety Co. of N.Y. v. Heyburn, 234 Ky. 739, 29 S.W. (2d) 6 (1930)
and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Woods, 256 Ky. 613, 76 S.W. (2d) 911 (1934)
the Kentucky court disregarded the position it had formerly taken without mention of the
Albritton case, supra note IO. It appears likely that the Kentucky court would attempt to
distinguish the apparently confficting decisions to be found in that state by the language
of the particular notice provision involved. See Sun Indemnity Co. v. Dulaney, 264 Ky.
112, 89 S.W. (2d) 307 (1935). The Idaho court ignored the Collard case dictum, supra
note 10, in Leach v. Farmers Automobile Interinsurance Exchange, 70 Idaho 156, 213 P.
(2d) 920 (1950).
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there, though Louisiana law on this point clearly is not settled,1 3 the
greater likelihood seems to be that this view will be rejected.14
The justification for giving the injured party an independent right
to proceed against the insurer has been attributed to the intended legal
effect of both liability insurance statutes15 and the notice clause itself.16
Neither of these reasons would seem sound. It is almost universally
agreed that the usual liability insurance statute is intended only to
change indemnity insurance into liability insurance with the object of
preventing the insurer from resisting liability solely on the basis of the
ins.ured's insolvency,1 7 and is not intended to give any further right to
the injured party.18 Likewise it seems most unrealistic to assert that the
contracting parties intended that the injured party's rights should in
no way be affected by non-compliance with the notice provision. As
stated above, the insurer has strong reason for seeking prompt notice of
accident and suit. It would therefore seem that the notice clause is
inserted with the understanding that due notice is thereby made a condition precedent to recovery, especially since the insured has no similarly
strong motive for insisting upon an independent right of recovery for an
as yet unknown injured party. With these bargaining positions in
mind, one can hardly be in doubt as to the intended effect of such a
provision.19 Thus, the abandonment of the primary right view by the
few courts that had accepted it is neither surprising nor difficult to
explain.
13 6 LA. L. REv. 729 (1946). Also see McClendon, "Public Liability Insurance," 10
TuLANB L. REv. 69 (1935).
14 State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Grimmer, (D.C. La. 1942) 47 F. Supp.
458, contains an excellent discussion of the present state of Louisiana law in regard to the
primary right rule. The court, in attempting to apply Louisiana law, concluded that the supreme court has not passed on the question and that the intermediate courts of the state,
with one possible exception, have rejected the Edwards case, supra note 10.
15 Edwards v. Fidelity Cas. Co., 11 La. App. 176, 123 S. 162 (1929); Bachman v.
Independence Indemnity Co., 112 Cal. App. 465, 297 P. 110 (1931).
16 Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Albritton, 214 Ky. 16, 282 S.W. 187 (1926).
17 James, "Accident Liability Reconsidered," 57 YALE L.J. 549 at 563 (1948); McClendon, "Public Liability Insurance," 10 TuLANB L. REv. 69 (1935). For a discussion of
legislative action in this area, see 25 CoL. L. REv. 661 (1925). Also Mass. Ann. Laws,
c. 175, §113A (1948), construed in Wheeler v. O'Connell, 297 Mass. 549, 9 N.E. (2d)
544 (1937), for a statute that does give the injured person an independent claim against
the insurer.
18 Lorando v, Gethro, 228 Mass. 181, 117 N.E. 185 (1917); Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928); Guerin v. Indemnity Co. of North
America, 107 Conn. 649, 142 A. 268 (1928); Allegretto v. Oregon Automobile Ins. Co.,
140 Ore. 538, 13 P. (2d) 647 (1932).
19 American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 159 Md. 631, 152
A. 523 (1930); Heller v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 27 Ohio App. 405, 161 N.E. 360
(1927); Bachhuber v. Boosalis, 200 Wis. 574, 229 N.W. 117 (1930); Peeler v. United
States Cas. Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261 (1929).
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IL The Doctrine of Substantial Prejudice
Ascertainment of the present status of the "substantial prejudice"
rule in notice clause cases offers a far more difficult problem. The departure from the prejudice rule is certainly not as pronounced nor as
perceptible as it is in the case of the older primary right approach. Since
the prejudice position is less extreme, the courts that have adopted it have
not been subjected to the same degree of pressure to change their position,
and the modifications that have taken place have been accomplished by
far more subtle devices. In addition, the abandonment of the primary
right rule by several courts has been accompanied by an acceptance of
the prejudice rule, 20 a not too surprising development in view of the
judicial dislike of a more drastic departure from precedent than is absolutely necessary. As a result, these cases, since they do in fact reHect
some slight trend toward the prejudice rule, tend to blur the whole
picture unless it is remembered that they also reHect a trend away from
the even more extreme primary right position. But the recent modification of position made by the Michigan court in Wehner v. Foster2 1
substantiates a suspicion raised by a number of prior cases-namely, that
there are inherent difficulties in the prejudice rule, and that these difficulties are forcing at least a relaxation of the prejudice requirement.
The prejudice rule is seriously weak from a practical standpoint. It
requires the insurer to show that it was prejudiced by the breach of the
notice clause, when as a practical matter the undue delay that constituted the breach is frequently the very barrier which prevents the insurer from proving prejudice.22 Or stated another way, "its weakness
is that, because legal evidence could rarely be found to establish what
the result would have been if seasonable notice had been given, the
insurer would usually be deprived of the valuable contractual right
seasonably to determine the course best adapted to protect itself."23 The
rather impossible situation in which the rule thus leaves the insurer has
not gone unrecognized, and the Michigan court in the Wehner case
joined the California court in an attempt to rectify at least partially
the dilemma. The Michigan court adopted the prejudice requirement
in Kennedy v. Dashner2 4 without any apparent qualifications or limita20 Hynding v. Home Accident Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743, 7 P. (2d) 999 (1932); Shirley
v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 163 Wash. 136, 300 P. 155 (1931); Leach v. Farmers
Automobile Interinsurance Exchange, 70 Idaho 156, 213 P. (2d) 920 (1950).
21331 Mich. 113, 49 N.W. (2d) 87 (1951).
22 24 CALIP. L. REv. 476 (1936).
2a Malloy v. Head, 90 N.H. 58 at 64, 4 A. (2d) 875 (1939).
24 319 Mich. 491, 30 N.W. (2d) 46 (1947). Position reaflirrned in Weller v. Cummins, 330 Mich. 286, 47 N.W. (2d) 612 (1951).
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ti.ans. However, in the Wehner case a delay of over seven months was,
in el.feet, held to raise a presumption of prejudice.25 This development
almost exactly parallels the modification of the rule made by the California court in Purefoy v. Paci-fie Automobile Indemnity Exchange26
where the court felt that a three and one-half month delay impelled
"the conclusion that prejudice must be presumed in such situations."27
Thus, after judicially imposing the added consideration of prejudice
upon the rights of the parties, these courts have invoked the aid of a
presumption to overcome an undesirable situation resulting from their
own rule. 28 Nevertheless, this presumption is a commendable innovation in so far as it recognizes and lessens the practical difficulty of the
rule, and use of the presumption is a well recognized, if not the most
direct, method for accomplishing desired changes in existing rules. 29
The requirement of prejudice, however, is not merely subject to
criticism on practical grounds, it is also open to attack on theoretical
grounds, for unless judicial legislation in a most unusual area is to be
condoned,30 no satisfactory basis for the rule can be advanced.31 The
asserted justification for the requirement has taken three forms: (I) the
public policy underlying the liability insurance statute dictates a re25 The actual holding was that in view of the length of the delay the testimony of the
insurer's assistant claims manager made a prima facie case that the insurer was prejudiced.
This testimony amounted to no more than a recital of the investigatory routine that the
insurer follows when notice of an accident is received. Since testimony of this nature is
available to the insurer in almost every case, the practical significance of the holding is that
in Michigan it is the injured party who is now likely to have the real burden of proof with
respect to the prejudice requirement.
2 6 5 Cal. (2d) 81 at 88, 53 P. (2d) 155 (1935). Also see 24 CALIP. L. RBv. 476
(1936).
27 The language used in the Purefoy decision, supra note 26, was so strong that the
appellate court in Brown Materials Co. v. Pacific Automobile Ins. Co., 52 Cal. App. (2d)
760, 127 P. (2d) 51 (1942), apparently felt that there was nothing left of the prejudice
requirement in California. However, Abrams v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 32 Cal. (2d)
233, 195 P. (2d) 797 (1948), clearly indicated that prejudice must still be considered in
California, and, as a result, the Brown Materials opinion came in for express disapproval in
Gibson v. Colonial Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. (2d) 33, 206 P. (2d) 387 (1949).
28 Modification through the use of presumption reached the ultimate in Distributors
Packing Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 21 Cal. App. (2d) 505, 70 P. (2d) 253 (1937),
where it was clearly intimated that the presumption of prejudice was a conclusive presumption. The supreme court in the Abrams decision, supra note 27, expressly denied that the
California courts had fallen into this embarrassing situation.
29 Morgan, "Some Observations Concerning Presumptions," 44 HARv. L. RBv. 906 at
909 (1931).
30 On the subject of the place of judicial legislation in our legal system see CARDOZO,
THE GROWTH OP THE LAW (1924).
31 A number of cases offer no specific basis for the requirement. Shirley v. American
Automobile Ins. Co., 163 Wash. 136, 300 P. 155 (1931); Hynding v. Home Accident
Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743, 7 P. (2d) 999 (1932); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Hattiesburg Hardware Stores, (Miss. 1951) 49 S. (2d) 813.
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quirement of prejudice;32 (2) unless there is a forfeiture clause or
express statement that notice is a condition precedent to liability, the
insurance contract calls for liability in the absence of prejudice regardless of the length of delay;33 and (3) prejudice to the insurer is one of
the factors to be considered in determining whether there was, in fact,
an unreasonable delay and, therefore, a breach of the notice provision.34
The first two statements are subject to much the same criticism as that
noted above with respect to the reasons advanced in support of the
primary right rule. To say that a liability insurance statute requires a
showing of prejudice by the insurer to defeat recovery disregards the
language and purpose of these statutes. 35 Wisconsin is the only known
jurisdiction with a statute which, in express terms, makes prejudice to
the insurer a factor in determining its liability.36 In the absence of such
an express legislative provision it is difficult to justify the position that
the public policy underlying the liability statute calls for the prejudice
requirement when the legislature has not included it among the provisions intended to effectuate the statute's objective.37
The proposition that the parties intended to incorporate the prejudice requirement into their insurance contract seems equally difficult
to sustain.38 The courts that have taken this position have distinguished
between policies with forfeiture clauses or clauses that expressly make
notice a condition precedent, and those that expressly call for due
notice, but do not spell out the intended legal effect of non-compliance
17 Umv. KANsAs CrTY L. REv. 63 (1949); 6 LA. L. REv. 729 (1946).
Indemnity Co. v. Banfield Bros. Packing Co., 188 Ark. 683, 67 S.W. (2d)
203 (1934); St. Paul & K. C. Short Line R. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
231 Mo. App. 613, 105 S.W. (2d) 14 (1937); Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v.
Jones County Lumber Co., 111 Miss. 759, 72 S. 152 (1916); 123 A.L.R. 950 (1939).
34 Brookville Electric Co. v. Utilities Ins. Co., (Mo. App. 1940) 142 S.W. (2d) 803
at 810, and in Wehner v. Foster, 331 Mich. 113, 49 N.W. (2d) 87 at 89, the court said,
"prejudice • • . is a necessary element to be considered in determining whether there has
been an unreasonable delay••••"
35 Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928); Kana
v. Fishman, 276 Mass. 206, 176 N.E. 922 (1931).
36 Wis. Stat. §204.34(3) (1951). The statute also imposes the burden of showing an
absence of prejudice on the injured party. Parrish v. Phillips, 229 Wis. 439, 282 N.W.
551 (1938). In Heimlich v. Kees Appliance Co., 256 Wis. 356 at 360, 41 N.W. (2d)
359 (1950), the Wisconsin court was not only unwilling to extend the statute to cover the
breach of a notice of suit clause, but also added that in any event in the case of a seventeen
month delay "we should probably have to determine as a matter of law that the [insurer]
was prejudiced by the delay."
37 Bachhuber v. Boosalis, 200 Wis. 574, 229 N.W. 117 (1930); Lorando v. Gethro,
228 Mass. 181, 117 N.E. 185 (1917).
38 Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Keliher, 88 N.H. 253, 187 A. 473 (1936); Malloy
v. Head, 90 N.H. 58, 4 A. (2d) 875 (1939); Houran v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of
N.Y., 109 Vt. 258, 195 A. 253 (1937); Heller v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 27 Ohio
App. 405, 161 N.E. 360 (1927).
32

33 Home
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or use the magic "condition precedent'' phrase.39 These cour.ts found
it impossible to hold that parties to "forfeiture clause" policies or "express condition precedent" policies intended liability to hinge on the
question of prejudice.40 However, it requires contract construction of
an only slightly less strained variety to :6nd a prejudice requirement in
policies without these express provisions.41 In fact it appears that the
prejudice requirement in at least some of these latter cases has crept
into the picture by indirection. The distinction was initially used in
some jurisdictions to dispose of the insurer's defense in cases where the
policies involved did not expressly cut off liability if due notice was not
given. 42 The use of this device, however, was not appealing when a
case arose where the delay was of extraordinary length and the insurer
held the sympathetic position.43 Reconciliation was worked out by requiring prejudice to the insurer if the particular insurance contract did
not expressly point out what the legal effect of non-compliance was to
be.44 Thus, these courts have developed a modified doctrine of prejudice, the use of the rule depending on the type of policy involved. The
distinction is explainable as a matter of historical development, but not
as a matter of good contract construction. This conclusion is substantiated by the difficulty encountered in determining whether or not a particular policy is of the type that requires application of the prejudice
rule. 45
To say that the question of prejudice is a proper consideration in
determining whether there has in fact been a breach of the notice provision is to ignore the actual manner in which the prejudice require39 For a very clear statement of this position see Home Indemnity Co. v. Banfield
Bros. Packing Co., 188 Ark. 683 at 690, 67 S.W. (2d) 203 (1934).
40 See State Farm Bureau Automobile Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, (Nev. 1950) 216 P. (2d)
606, 18 A.L.R. (2d) 431.
41 St. Louis Architectural Iron Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., (8th Cir. 1930) 40
F. (2d) 344, cert. den. 282 U.S. 882, 51 S.Ct. 86 (1930).
42 Hope Spoke Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 102 Ark. 1, 143 S.W. 85 (1912); Watson
v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 28 Ariz. 573, 238 P. 338 (1925).
43 In Home Life & Accident Co. v. Beckner, 168 Ark. 283, 270 S.W. 529 (1925), a nineteen month delay was held to be unreasonable and to bar recovery, even though a majority
of the court felt that the policy in question was of the same type as that involved in the
Hope Spoke Company case, supra note 42. In Home Indemnity Co. v. Banfield Bros.
Packing Co., 188 Ark. 683, 67 S.W. (2d) 203 (1934), the Arkansas court explained the
Beckner opinion on the grounds that inherent in the court's decision was a finding of
prejudice.
44 Home Indemnity Co. v. Banfield Bros. Packing Co., 188 Ark. 683, 67 S.W. (2d)
203 (1934); Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Arizona Concrete Co., 47 Ariz. 420, 56 P. (2d)
188 (1936); St. Paul & K. C. Short Line R. Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 231 Mo.
App. 613, 105 S.W. (2d) 14 (1937).
45 See the dissenting opinions in-Home Life & Accident Co. v. Beckner, 168 Ark. 283, 270
S.W. 529 (1929) and New York Life Insurance Co. v. Moose, 190 Ark. 161, 78 S.W.
(2d) 64 (1935).

1952]

COMMENTS

283

ment is applied in the cases. VVhile courts generally agree that notice
"within a reasonable time" is compliance with the notice clause, there
is a rather wide divergence of opinion upon application of the test. 46
The cases, ·however, seem clearly to repudiate the idea that prejudice
to the insurer ever affects or determines what is a reasonable length of
time. 47 There are cases in which courts that adhere to the prejudice
doctrine expressly £nd that there has been a breach of the notice provision before turning to the question of prejudice.48 Similarly the factor
is ignored in the converse situation, i.e., where notice has been given
within a comparatively short period of time as measured by absolute
standards, and the court decides that there has not been a breach of the
notice provision. In this latter type of case there is apparently no decision that even vaguely suggests that if the insurer had shown prejudice
the breach question might have been answered differently-the cases
in fact indicating that quite the contrary is true. 49 Confusion as to the
place of the prejudice factor in the entire notice area has been caused
by failure to distinguish between notice clause cases and cooperation
clause cases.50 In many respects the two kinds of cases are closely
analogous, and for most purposes can justifiably be classified as a single
group. But such treatment when dealing with the prejudice concept is
not always sound. 51 Breach of the cooperation clause is generally held
to require a material or substantial failure to cooperate with the insurer. 52 In attempting to mark out what constitutes more than trivial
non-compliance and, therefore, a breach of the provision, it is not surprising that some courts have adopted the prejudice test or used language closely resembling the use of the prejudice test. 53 Thus, in these
jurisdictions, the question of prejudice may be a part of the question
46 16 BosT. UNIV. L. REv. 229 (1936).
47 Houran v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co.

of N.Y., 109 Vt. 258 at 266, 195 A. 253
(1937).
48 Gibson v. Colonial Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. (2d) 33, 206 P. (2d) 387 (1949); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Hattiesburg Hardware Stores, (Miss. 1951) 49 S. (2d)
813.
49 See the analysis in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Waggoner, 193 Ark. 550, 101 S.W.
(2d) 451 (1937) and Leach v. Farmers Automobile Interinsurance Exchange, 70 Idaho
156, 213 P. (2d) 920 (1950).
50 Along with the notice clause the usual liability insurance policy contains a provision
calling for the cooperation of the insured with the insurer in the handling of claims based
on the policy. 49 CoL. L. REv. 280 (1949).
51 See Houran v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of N.Y., 109 Vt. 258 at 271, 195 A.
253 (1937).
52 Curran v. Connecticut Indemnity Co., 127 Conn. 692, 20 A. (2d) 87 (1941). Also
see 49 CoL. L. REv. 280 (1949) and 81 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 88 (1932).
53 Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Keliher, 88 N.H. 253, 187 A. 473 (1936); George v.
Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 219 Ala. 307, 122 S. 175 (1929); Buckner v. Buckner, 207 Wis. 303, 241 N.W. 342 (1932).
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of breach. But the prejudice test is used in these cooperation cases to
determine a degree question of a very different nature from that found
in the notice clause cases,54 and the use of the prejudice rule in the
former type of case cannot safely or justifiably be used as authority for
a similar requirement in notice cases.55 Many instances, however, can
be found where the distinguishing features between the two types of
cases have not been observed, with the result that attempts are made to
justify the prejudice rule with respect to its use in notice cases on the
grounds of its being an element of the breach question, when in actual
application, the rule is treated as an entirely independent question in
and of itself.

III. Conclusion
When the practical difficulty of the prejudice requirement is viewed
in connection with its theoretical weakness, it may well be wondered
how and why the rule was ever adopted in any jurisdiction. Perhaps
the most realistic explanation is that it affords a ready device for disposing of the many cases in which the insurer's asserted defense appears
to be grounded on a mere technicality,66 i.e., the "hard" cases. At any
rate there is little doubt that the prejudice rule is currently in vogue in
one form or another in several jurisdictions, with little or no indication
5 4 "The reason why immaterial and unsubstantial failures of an assured do not constitute a breach is because they are not included within the fair intendment of the requirement that the assured co-operate, and lack of prejudice ••• is a test which usually determines that a failure is of that nature." Curran v. Connecticut Indemnity Co., 127 Conn.
692 at 696, 20 A. (2d) 87 (1941).
55 The Pennsylvania court has accepted the doctrine of substantial prejudice with
respect to cooperation clause cases, even going so far as to impo,se the burden of proving
prejudice on the insurer. Cameron v. Berger, 336 Pa. 229, 7 A. (2d) 293 (1939); Donaldson v. Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 106, 14 A. (2d) 117 (1940).
However in notice clause cases, the court has expressly rejected the rule, doing so without
reference to the position it has taken with respect to cooperation provisions. Ross v. Mayflower Drug Stores, Inc., 338 Pa. 211, 12 A. (2d) 569 (1940); UnveIZagt v. Prestera, 339
Pa. 141, 13 A. (2d) 46 (1940). Also see infra note 58. It should be noted, however, that
rejection of the prejudice requirement in cooperation cases is a sound basis for the proposition that the rule will also be rejected in notice cases. The nature of the cooperation requirement lends itself to the use of the prejudice test more readily than does the notice
requirement, so that rejection of the rule in the former class of cases foreshadows, both in
theory and in practice, its rejection as a valid consideration in the notice area. Cf. Riggs
v. New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Co., 126 Ore. 404, 270 P. 479 (1929); Allegretto v.
Oregon Automobile Ins. Co., 140 Ore. 538, 13 P. (2d) 647 (1932) and Hoffman v.
Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 146 Ore. 66, 29 P. (2d) 557 (1934); also Coleman
v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928); and Rushing v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 251 N.Y. 302, 167 N.E. 450 (1929).
56 As a matter of self-protection it is advisable for the injured party to serve notice
upon the insurer himself, since it is generally held that the notice requirement can be
satisfied in this way. Slavens v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., (9th Cir. 1928) 27 F. (2d)
859. Also 76 A.L.R. 23 (1932).
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that the concept is in any immediate danger of complete and express
rejection.57 In addition, there are several jurisdictions where the question of the court's position is a matter of some doubt. 58 Uncertainty
seems to be the keynote particularly in jurisdictions that have in the
past distinguished insurance contracts on the basis of the language used,
applying the prejudice rule where notice was not, in the mind of the
court, made a condition precedent to liability. 59 These courts frequently
:find themselves with authority for every and any proposition they might
wish to use with respect to the particular case at hand. As a result, the
courts in these jurisdictions appear to be in a very B.uid, if not confused,
state on this point.60 But the significant factor to be gathered from both
the clear-cut prejudice rule jurisdictions and those in the indefinite
category is that two methods of modifying the prejudice rule have been
worked out-namely, by use of the presumption and by distinguishing
on the basis of language used in the policy. Thus, it appears likely that
when cases arise which will bring the weaknesses of the prejudice doctrine into sharp focus, one can expect a continued and extended use of
these two devices to impair the significance of the prejudice requirement.

John W. Hupp, S.Ed.
57 See Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Arizona Concrete Co., 47 Ariz. 420, 56
P. (2d) 188 (1936); Abrams v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 32 Cal. (2d) 233, 195 P.
(2d) 797 (1948); Leach v. Farmers Automobile Interinsurance Exchange, 70 Idaho 156,
213 P. (2d) 920 (1950); Weller v. Cummins, 330 Mich. 286, 47 N.W. (2d) 612 (1951);
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Hattiesburg Hardware Stores, (Miss. 1951) 49 S.
(2d) 813; Shirley v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 163 Wash. 136, 300 P. 155 (1931).
58 For example, Alabama. George v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 219 Ala.
307, 122 S. 175 (1929), is frequently cited as a leading authority for the prejudice rule.
Leach v. Farmers Automobile Interinsurance Exchange, 70 Idaho 156, 213 P. (2d) 920
(1950); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Koval, (10th Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d)
ll8; Hynding v. Home Accident Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743, 7 P. (2d) 999 (1932). In the
first place it should be noted that the George case is a cooperation clause case. In addition,
the language used in the decision tends to support the proposition for which the case is
cited in 49 CoL. L. R:sv. 280 (1949), i.e., that a trivial failure to cooperate does not constitute a breach of the policy provisions. Thus, as is stated in General Accident Fire &
Life Assurance Corp. v. Rinnert, (5th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 440 at 442, "whether or
not the insurance company must show prejudice to its cause by the violation complained
of is not clear from the Alabama decisions." Also see Employers Ins. Co. of Alabama v.
Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 S. 671 (1937); Employers Ins. Co. of Alabama v. Brooks, 250
Ala. 36, 33 S. (2d) 3 (1947).
59 See cases cited supra note 44. Also Stewart v. Commerce Ins. Co., ll4 Utah 278,
198 P. (2d) 467 (1948).
60 Cf. Finkle v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 224 Mo. App. 285, 26 S.W. (2d) 843
(1930); Walker v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 229 Mo. App. 1202, 70 S.W. (2d)
82 (1934); Brookville Electric Co. v. Utilities Ins. Co., (Mo. App. 1940) 142 S.W. (2d)
803; Donlon v. American Motorists Ins. Co., (Mo. App. 1941) 147 S.W. (2d) 176 (1941),
rehearing overruled 149 S.W. (2d) 378 (1941).

